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Resumo/Abstract: 
 
 
Two of the central challenges faced by Cape Verde at the present are the high level of unemployment and 
the increasing proportion of the population that lives below the poverty line. 
Microenterprise development can be an effective means of addressing both problems in a developing 
country like Cape Verde, where microenterprises account for about 50% of employment. In this paper we 
provide a detailed profile of micro firms’ owners and investigate the relationship between their 
characteristics and the resort to outside seed capital. We find a cluster of factors - the microentrepreneur’s 
age, gender, level of education and reason for being self-employed - which influence significantly the 
probability of being in need for external startup capital. The policy implications of these findings for the 
design of a specific microfinance program for Cape Verde are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Cape Verde is a small developing country whose development has been hindered by 
poor natural resources, prolonged cycles of drought, a narrow productive base, small 
domestic markets and costly communications. Notwithstanding, mostly due to 
substantial emigrants’ remittances and financial and technical aid received from various 
international institutions and bilateral donors, during the last 15 years significant 
improvements have been made in many areas. Indeed, according to the latest Human 
Development Report available (UNDP, 2004), all the three items of the human 
development index (the life expectancy, education and GDP indexes) for Cape Verde 
are now above the average for developing countries and well above the average for Sub-
Saharan Africa. In contrast, unemployment remains high and a recent report from the 
Cape Verde National Institute of Statistics (INE) shows that the proportion of Cape 
Verdeans officially deemed to be living in (relative) poverty increased from 30.2% in 
1989 to 36.4% in 2002 (INE, 2003b). As stressed by Bourdet (2000), the Achilles heel 
of the Cape Verdean economy is the (un)employment and poverty situation. 
Over the last twenty years, many scholars and policymakers around the world have 
argued that an important tool for reducing unemployment and eradicating poverty is to 
provide financial assistance to microenterprises, since they represent the ‘backbone’ of 
the local economies in less developed countries, contributing substantially to the overall 
employment level. Namely, as the formal credit institutions are neither prepared nor 
interested to attend this type of clientele, improving access to credit by 
microentrepreneurs is one of the principal ways of guaranteeing (self-)employment to 
the poorest population and, as a consequence, of reducing its level of poverty. In Cape 
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Verde, where 89.7% of Cape Verdean firms may be classified as microenterprises1 
(INE, 1999), the economic importance of the microenterprise sector has been recently 
recognized by the government, which intends to intensify and expand the microcredit 
programs initiated some years ago. Therefore, several of the credits received from 
international donors are now being directed to support the promotion of 
microentrepreneurs within the framework of a self-employment strategy (see, for 
example, IMF’s, 2005, ‘Cape Verde: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’, pp. 61-63). 
Assuming that the lack of start-up capital and access to external funding are the 
primary impediments for the poor to start and sustain their businesses, microcredit 
seems to be indeed the most promising way of promoting the creation and expansion of 
their microenterprises. However, some recent studies (e.g. Glackin, 2002) suggest that 
lack of credit demand is as important as lack of supply, since there exist several 
program and client-related barriers that discourage or prevent potential borrowers of 
participating in microcredit programs (see inter alia Evans et al., 1999, for an example 
of a program that failed to achieve a significant outreach due to a lack in demand for 
loans offered). Moreover, despite the difficulty in evaluating the merits of a given 
microcredit program, several of them seem to have failed as agents of poverty 
alleviation for many of their participants (see for example the impact assessment studies 
by Copestake et al., 2001, Mosley, 2001, and Shaw, 2004). Also in Cape Verde some 
microcredit experiences with diverse successes have occurred in the past (see UNDP, 
2002, p. 35). 
Clearly, no single microcredit policy is likely to exist that is adequate for all the 
different segments of the poor of all countries and, hence, merely trying to replicate 
lending strategies that were successful in other places will most likely fail to achieve 
any significant results. Instead, in order to increase the rates of participation and success 
                                                          
1 In this paper we classify as microenterprises all firms with five or less employees, including the owner. 
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in microcredit programs, it is essential to have a deep understanding of the main 
characteristics of local microentrepreneurs and design microcredit schemes tailored to 
them. Therefore, in this paper, based on a comprehensive survey questionnaire 
conducted by one of the authors in Cape Verde in 2003, we examine the main 
characteristics of the potential demand side of the microcredit process in Cape Verde 
and analyze their policy implications. In particular, we provide a detailed profile of 
Cape Verdean microenterprises and microentrepreneurs, analyze the major financing 
sources available to start-up microenterprises in Cape Verde, investigate the relationship 
between the resort to borrowed seed capital and both the owner’s socioeconomic 
background and the microenterprise specific characteristics, and show the usefulness of 
the results obtained in the paper for defining appropriate microfinance strategies to 
support the creation, development and survival of Cape Verdean microenterprises. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the 
Cape Verde social and economic context. Section 3 describes the data used in the study, 
the main characteristics of Cape Verdean microenterprises, and the alternative financing 
sources used by microentrepreneurs at the foundation of their firm. Section 4 studies the 
factors that influence the need for external start-up capital. Section 5 concludes the 
paper, discussing the policy implications of our results. 
 
2. Cape Verde social and economic characterization 
 
Cape Verde is a small archipelago of only 4033 km2 made up of ten mountainous 
islands located about 500 kilometers off the West African coast. Only nine of the 
islands are populated, with about half of the resident population of about 435 000 living 
in the main island, Santiago (INE, 2003a). Similarly to most developing countries, the 
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overwhelming majority of Cape Verdean enterprises is of very small size: in 1997, 
89.7% of the total number of firms were microenterprises, which accounted for an 
estimated 50% of employment (INE, 1999). However, the structure of the Cape 
Verdean economy differs substantially from most Sub-Saharan countries in terms of the 
dominant role played by the tertiary sector, which has been the mainstay of the 
economy, generating most of the economic growth experienced since 1990 and 
accounting for 72% of GDP and 57% of employment, see Figure 1. The poor natural 
resource base, particularly with respect to fresh water and arable land (only an estimated 
10% of the land surface is suitable for agriculture), together with adverse climatic 
conditions, with repeated and often long-lasting droughts, explain the poor performance 
and low productivity of the agricultural sector, whose production covers only a scant 10 
to 15% of food requirements in an average year. The industrial base is also rather small 
due to the absence of important mineral resources, severe localization disadvantages and 
a very limited home market. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Compared with other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, most economic and social 
indicators in Cape Verde are quite impressive, as Table 1 illustrates. However, despite 
these remarkable achievements, the employment situation remains bad, with high and 
persistent levels of unemployment (around 20% in recent years) and many precarious 
jobs in the large informal sector and in the so-called FAIMOs, where an important share 
of the active population is still working in seasonal, labour-intensive public works.2 
Moreover, a national survey of household income and expenditure conducted between 
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October 2001 and October 2002 by INE shows clearly that the strong economic growth 
in the last decade was asymmetrical, not contributing to a proportionate and meaningful 
poverty reduction. Indeed, according to the results obtained by INE (2003b) using a 
relative concept of poverty, while in 1989 about 30.2% of the population were poor and 
14.1% very poor, in 2002 those figures increased to 36.4% and 19.9%, respectively. At 
the origin of this situation is the type of growth achieved, which has not created 
employment in a significant way. Growth has been stimulated from the outside, with 
foreign aid and expatriate remittances together accounting for 29% of GDP (UNDP, 
2002). In 2003, the total external debt increased to 75.5% of GDP from an average of 
57.3% during the period 1993-2002 (ADB, 2005). 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
3. Survey questionnaire 
 
3.1. Design 
 
Our study of the microenterprise sector in Cape Verde is based on a structured 
questionnaire administered directly by one of the authors to 120 microentrepreneurs in 
May and June 2003. The questions included in the survey are relative to the 
characteristics of the microentrepeneur and his/her microenterprise both at the time the 
latter was created and the moment the questionnaire took place. The questionnaires 
were filled out by the authors during personal interviews with the microentrepeneurs. In 
fact, after carrying out the survey, we are certain that a direct interview technique is the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
2 The FAIMOs were created by the government of Cape Verde almost thirty years ago with the aim of 
generating employment in the rural areas to ensure a minimum income to the rural families devastated by 
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only successful way of conducting a survey of this nature in Cape Verde since, due to 
the low schooling level of most microentrepeneurs, many questions had to be clarified 
and suited to their level of education. 
All the interviews took place on the two most populous islands of Cape Verde, 
Santiago and São Vicente, which together account for about 70% of the resident 
population (INE, 2003a), 66% of the poor population (INE, 2003b) and 65% of micro 
firms (INE, 1999). To ensure an adequate representation of the target population, the 
respondents were selected from two location-based categories that reflect approximately 
their weight in the universe of microenterprises in those two islands: an urban cohort of 
77 microentrepeneurs, 44 of whom were drawn from the capital city of Praia (Santiago) 
and surroundings, and 33 from the city of Mindelo (São Vicente), which are the two 
largest Cape Verdean cities; and a rural group of 43 microentrepeneurs, located in the 
Santiago municipalities of Santa Catarina (18), Santa Cruz (14), and São Domingos 
(11), where most people live in small-scattered villages and work in agriculture, cattle 
raising and fisheries.3 From each location, the micro firms were then randomly sampled 
from the database “Ficheiro de Unidades Estatísticas” managed by INE, who supplied 
their addresses and phone numbers. 
 
3.2. Profile of microenterprises and microentrepreneurs in Cape Verde 
 
Figure 2 reports summary information about the microenterprises in our sample. The 
surveyed companies range from those recently founded (21.7% of the firms were 
created in the last 2 years and 50% in the last 5 years) to ‘mature’ firms (30% were 
founded more than 10 years ago and 9.2% are over age 20). The very small firms are 
                                                                                                                                                                          
droughts. At the end of the 1990s, some 10% of the active population were still employed in them. 
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predominant: more than two thirds of the firms have 2 or less employees (including the 
owner) and in a quarter of the firms the only worker is the microentrepreneur. Half of 
the respondent firms operate in the trade sector (Fig. 2C) and almost two thirds of them 
(64.2%) are located in urban areas. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Regarding the microentrepreneurs, the evidence in some of their characteristics is set 
out in Figure 3. Some of those characteristics are relative to 2003 and others to the year 
the firm was created. Most business owners are less than 40 years old (56.7%) and 
80.8% became owner of the firm before that age (Fig. 3A and 3B). In both cases the 
same age category (31-40) is dominant but the proportion of the respondents who 
became entrepreneurs before age 30 is also considerable (38.3%). More than two thirds 
(70%) of the microentrepreneurs are married (Fig. 3D) and, somewhat surprisingly, 
most (53.3%) are women (Fig. 3C). This higher proportion of female 
microentrepreneurs is certainly related to the higher risk of unemployment faced by the 
female population, which suggests that women see self-employment as an important 
means of avoiding unemployment.4 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Although Cape Verde has registered very positive developments in the sector of 
education in the last decade, the level of education of most microentrepreneurs is still 
                                                                                                                                                                          
3 Note that about half of the population living in the rural areas of Santiago are poor, which represents 
42.5% of the Cape Verdean total poor population (INE, 2003b). 
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very low. They reported an average of 6.1 years of schooling, 6.7% never attended 
school and 65.0% only attended the primary education system, which presently consists 
of six compulsory years (Fig. 3E). Only 7.5% were involved in higher education. 
Moreover, none of the individuals in our sample has improved his/her schooling level 
since becoming an entrepreneur, which suggests that the several programs promoting 
adult education organized in the last decade are not attracting all the strata of the Cape 
Verdean population. 
Only 27.5% of the microenterprise owners became entrepreneurs less than five years 
ago, while 42.5% have been entrepreneurs for more than ten years (Fig. 3F). Slightly 
more than one third of the respondents (35.8%) owned other firms before assuming the 
control of their current enterprise (Fig. 3G). Although most microentrepreneurs (57.5%) 
started their activity ‘voluntarily’ (Fig. 3H)5, an important proportion of 
microentrepreneurs (42.5%) said that they were forced to do so due to the lack of 
alternatives for overcoming their difficult economic situation (poverty and/or 
unemployment). Reinforcing the conjecture made above, note that 51.6% of females 
started their business ‘involuntarily’ against only 32.1% of men. 
Our survey reveals that there are significant differences in the characteristics of 
urban and rural microentrepreneurs, as the results reported in Table 2 show clearly. 
Indeed, from the eleven characteristics analyzed so far, only two are not statistically 
different at a 5% level. Undoubtedly, on average, rural microenterprises are smaller and 
more concentrated on the trade sector, and their owners are younger and less educated 
and have fewer years of experience as entrepreneurs, despite becoming entrepreneurs at 
                                                                                                                                                                          
4 According to IMF, 2005, the economic acceleration occurred in the 90s merely absorbed females 
entering the workforce without changing their rate of unemployment. In contrast, the unemployment rate 
among the male population was cut by more than half. 
5 From which 44.1% become self-employed due to their liking for their business idea, 16.2% to 
complement family income, 14.7% because the expected income from self-employment was greater than 
the income from a salaried position, 13.2% in order to gain more independence, and 11.8% to follow 
family tradition. 
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a younger age. More than two thirds of the rural microentrepreneurs are women, while 
in urban areas the majority of the micro firms are owned by men. Strikingly, 62.8% of 
rural respondents created their business only as a last resort to fight their economic 
problems, while in urban regions more than two thirds (68.8%) are entrepreneurs by 
choice. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 also compares our results with those obtained by Heino and Págan (2001) for 
microentrepreneurs located in urban areas of Mexico, which, is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the only similar study realized so far. The main differences between the 
urban microentrepreneurs of the two countries (all of them significant at a 1% level) are 
the much higher proportion of females (44.2% against only 22.4%), ‘involuntary’ 
entries into self-employment (31.2% vs. 14.1%), and microentrepreneurs with previous 
experience (36.4% vs. 11.0%) and the larger average number of employees (2.6 vs. 1.8) 
in the Cape Verdean case. Obviously, these are key differences that illustrate clearly the 
importance of taking into account the specific characteristics of local 
microentrepreneurs when defining microcredit or similar programs for a particular 
country or region and, thus, highlight the relevance of our paper for practitioners. 
 
3.3. Initial financing 
 
When questioned about their financing preferences, the large majority of respondents 
(92.0%) said that they would use their own savings in first place and, only if necessary, 
they would then resort to outside funding (see Figure 4A). However, the actual start-up 
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financial sources of Cape Verdean microentrepreneurs are evenly distributed between 
internal and external sources (Fig. 4B), which suggests that most of those who used 
external funds were forced to do so due to insufficient savings and reinforces the idea 
that many microentrepreneurs only started their business due to their difficult economic 
situation.6 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
A slightly higher proportion of the respondents (51.7%) used mainly outside 
financing, most of which (64.5%) borrowed funds from informal sources such as family 
members (48.4%) and moneylenders, customers, suppliers and friends (16.1%), see 
Table 3. Only about one third of the microentrepreneurs who used external financing 
resorted to formal sources such as banks (21.0%) and microcredit institutions (14.5%). 
Fear of bankers, high interest rates and lack of collateral were identified as the key 
constraints to accessing capital in the formal market. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Again, there is a clear split between urban and rural areas. As could be expected, 
since the poverty incidence in Cape Verde is much higher in rural zones (INE, 2003b), 
while in urban areas the savings of the majority of microentrepreneurs were sufficient to 
finance the start-up capital of their firm, in rural regions more than two thirds (69.8%) 
of the respondents were forced to resort to external financing sources. In both cases, 
loans from family were the main outside initial funding source, but their importance is 
                                                          
6 Thus, Cape Verdean microentrepreneurs seem to follow the pecking-order model of financing hierarchy 
that claims that firms use external financing only when internal funds are insufficient. See inter alia 
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substantially higher in rural areas, where the only other important financing alternative 
is microcredit. In contrast, a considerable proportion of urban microentrepreneurs 
resorted also to other informal lenders and banks. 
 
4. Econometric analysis of the factors that influence the resort to external start-up 
capital 
 
We use a probit model to analyze which characteristics of microentrepreneurs are 
more relevant for explaining the utilization of external funds in the financing of start-up 
micro firms. For the reasons indicated earlier, these factors will also roughly explain the 
‘need’ for outside seed capital of the existent Cape Verdean microenterprises, since the 
huge majority of the microentrepreneurs in our sample used external funds only because 
their savings were insufficient to finance their business. We relate the binary dependent 
variable (y) of our model, which indicates whether the microentrepreneur resorted to 
outside start-up capital (y = 1) instead of using his/her own savings (y = 0), to the set of 
explanatory variables described next. Relative to the characteristics of the 
microentrepreneur at the time his/her firm was created, we defined the variables AGE 
(in years), AGE2 (AGE squared), EDUCATION (years of schooling), FEMALE, 
MARRIED, OTHER_FIRMS and INVOLUNTARY, where the last four are dummy 
variables which assume the value 1 if the microentrepreneur is a female, married, 
owned other firms before and entered involuntarily into self-employment, respectively. 
Additionally, we defined three other dummy variables: URBAN and TRADE, which 
have the value of 1 if the micro firm is located in an urban area and operates in the trade 
sector, respectively, and PRE_1991, which has the value of 1 if the firm was founded in 
1991 or before and the value of 0 otherwise. The inclusion of the last variable in the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) for details on this popular capital structure theory. 
 13
model is justified by the important economic reforms that started in 1991 in Cape 
Verde, which, in order to promote the development of the private sector, included 
several policies of financing support to small and medium enterprises.7 
Table 4 reports the estimated results. Considering first the empirical adequacy of our 
model, it seems that it fits the data well. Indeed, the LR test for the joint significance of 
the ten explanatory variables is significant at the 1% level; Davidson and MacKinnon’s 
(1984) test for the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is not significant; the RESET 
test (Pagan and Vella, 1989) provides no evidence of distributional or functional form 
misspecification; the model correctly predicts the two outcomes 72.5% of the time, 
being only slightly more successful in the prediction of one of the outcomes; and 
McFadden´s (1974) pseudo R2 is 0.217, which does not seem too bad for a cross-
sectional study. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
We find that the majority of the model variables influence significantly the resort to 
external financing, namely INVOLUNTARY and PRE_1991 (which are significant at 
the 1% level), AGE and AGE2 (5% level), and FEMALE and EDUCATION (10% 
level). The others do not seem to affect significantly the need for outside seed capital, 
including the variable URBAN, which implies that, despite the markedly distinct 
characteristics of urban and rural microentrepreneurs, it appears that after controlling for 
their differences, the location of the micro firm is not important for the financing 
decisions of their owner. 
                                                          
7 Since 1991, the Cape Verdean government has been steadily reducing its central role in the economy. 
The several economic reforms implemented gradually created a private-sector-led economy, where, 
according to the last Enterprise Survey (INE, 1999), in 1997 some 97% of the enterprises were privately 
owned by Cape Verdeans, 2% foreign-owned, and only 1% owned by the state. 
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In average terms (see the last column of Table 4), the economic reforms that took 
place in 1991 increased the probability of micro firms resorting to outside start-up 
capital by 35 percentage points. Clearly, the policies adopted at that time to promote the 
private sector in Cape Verde produced a large impact over the microenterprise sector, 
being fundamental for the rapid and substantial increase in the number of micro firms 
during the 1990s by motivating many Cape Verdeans without significant savings to 
resort to external funding in order to create their own enterprise. A well-designed 
microfinance policy will potentially have similar effects. 
As expected, the probability of resorting to outside start-up capital is much higher 
(by 31.8 percentage points) for the microentrepreneurs that started their businesses due 
to the lack of other income-generating alternatives, since their savings were certainly 
smaller. Also probably due to their insufficient savings, since the female unemployment 
rate is higher, female microenterprise owners are more likely to resort to external 
financing by 23.0 percentage points than their male counterparts. 
Well-educated microentrepreneurs are better endowed with technical skills, business 
acumen, ambition and self-confidence. Moreover, they are less reluctant to expose 
themselves to the risks associated with large loans due to their better understanding of 
the functioning of the credit market and of the alternative financing sources available. 
For all these reasons, their microenterprises tend to be larger and, hence, require more 
initial funding, which explains the positive relationship found between the 
microentrepreneurs’ need for outside start-up capital and their level of education: 
according to our model, the probability of resorting to external financing increases by 
2.5 percentage points for each additional year of schooling. 
Finally, the need for start-up external financing is larger among the youngest and 
oldest microentrepreneurs in our sample, as illustrated in Figure 5. The former possess 
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no significant personal wealth accumulation, and, hence, the only means of starting their 
business is resorting to outside capital, as could be anticipated. Less expected are the 
results found for older microentrepreneurs, although similar results have been found by 
Heino and Pagán (2001) for the Mexican economy.8 A possible explanation for this 
finding is that most of the microentrepreneurs that start their businesses at older ages 
reach this phase with no significant savings and, aiming at escaping poverty or avoiding 
falling into that situation after retirement, see self-employment as their last chance to 
increase substantially their incomes. 
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
The partial effects presented in Table 4 do not really correspond to a particular 
individual since they are based on the averages of each dummy variable. Therefore, in 
Table 5 we present the estimated probabilities of Cape Verdeans microentrepreneurs 
resorting to outside start-up capital at some interesting values of their characteristics. 
Namely, to save space, we fixed the explanatory variables found statistically 
insignificant at their predominant values in the sample and, only for microenterprises 
created after 1991, computed those probabilities at two distinct values of each one of the 
other significant variables. The results found clearly illustrate the heterogeneity of Cape 
Verdeans microentrepreneurs, with the probabilities of resorting to external financing 
ranging from 6.0% (a male microentrepreneur of age 40 with no education who started 
his business ‘voluntarily’) to 96.3% (a well-educated, female, 20 years old - or 55, the 
results, not reported, are similar - microentrepreneur with no other employment 
alternatives). 
                                                          
8 Actually, despite obtaining the same signs for the variables AGE and AGE2 (both of which were 
significant at the 1% level), Heino and Pagán (2001) mistakenly concluded that, whatever the 
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Table 5 about here 
 
5. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
 
In this paper we provided a detailed profile of the microenterprise sector in Cape 
Verde. Some key features emerge from our survey. First, most Cape Verdean 
microentrepreneurs are females, created their firm before age 40, work alone or have 
only one employee, operate in the trade sector in urban areas, have a very low level of 
education, and started their business ‘voluntarily’. Second, micro firms located in rural 
areas are significantly different from those established in urban areas: they are smaller 
and more concentrated in the trade sector, their owners are younger and less educated 
and a larger proportion are females and entered involuntarily into self-employment. 
Third, although the huge majority of microentrepreneurs had preferred to finance their 
firm using their own resources, most of them were forced to resort to outside start-up 
capital due to insufficient savings. Informal founts, particularly family members, are the 
major sources of external financing. 
The strong association between certain endogenous characteristics of the 
microentrepreneurs and the resort to outside start-up capital warrants special 
consideration. In our econometric analysis we identified a cluster of risk factors - the 
microentrepreneur’s age, gender, level of education and reason for becoming self-
employed - which influences significantly the probability of being in need for external 
capital. Namely, the resort to outside start-up capital is higher when the owner of the 
micro firm is relatively young or relatively old, is a woman, possesses more years of 
schooling and entered into self-employment involuntarily. The profound economic 
                                                                                                                                                                          
microentrepreneur’s age, it influences negatively the resort to outside start-up capital. 
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reforms implemented after 1991 also appear to have been decisive for the expansion of 
the number of microenterprises that resort to outside start-up capital. 
Given their importance in the Cape Verdean economy, providing better conditions 
for the creation and growth of microenterprises will be crucial for the success of any 
political strategy aiming at reducing unemployment and poverty in a sustainable way. In 
such a strategy, the development of adequate financing mechanisms designed 
specifically for Cape Verde will be an essential instrument for promoting economic 
activity and creating employment. However, given the particular and heterogeneous 
characteristics of Cape Verdean microentrepreneurs, the chances of success of a rigid 
and minimalist microfinance policy based exclusively on microcredit are very low. To 
increase its probability of success, such policy should be tailored to the characteristics 
of the specific segment of the population being targeted and a notable portion of its 
budget should be expended in the delivery of training and technical assistance. Our 
study identifies some factors that deserve direct attention in the design of a 
microfinance policy for Cape Verde insofar as they may function as important 
determinants of microcredit access and success. 
First, the low level of education of most Cape Verdean microentrepreneurs may 
compromise their ability to understand the benefits of credit, assert their desire to join 
the program and successfully utilize credit, as argued by Evans et al. (1999) in their 
study relative to Bangladesh. Thus, the adult education programs that have been 
organized in Cape Verde in the last few years should be intensified and, in order to 
attract a larger number of individuals, some of them should be directed to specific 
classes of the population. Indeed, as our survey shows, none of the microentrepreneurs 
in our sample has improved his/her level of education since founding his/her firm. 
Moreover, a very important role in the microcredit programs should be reserved for 
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nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), since they know better the local realities, are 
closer to the populations, have more flexibility of action, and, hence, are clearly more 
capacitated to really reach the eligible beneficiaries with low education and promote the 
appropriate follow-up. However, so far, NGOs have been weakly involved in the 
poverty reduction programs undertaken in Cape Verde (see UNDP, 2002). 
Second, our survey reveals that a considerable proportion of micro firms owners 
have become self-employed only because they had no alternatives. These 
microentrepreneurs, who are typically females living in rural areas that where forced to 
resort to outside start-up capital to create their firms, are more likely to be poorly-
motivated, to operate in businesses where they can barely subsist, and to lack technical 
expertise in business operations and management. For such individuals, the primary 
challenges for any poverty reduction program will be to ensure that they operate in the 
sectors of activity where their probability of succeeding is higher and to build their 
motivation, entrepreneurial spirit and capacity to become real entrepreneurs. Thus, at 
least in these cases, microfinance programs should start by conducting an accurate 
assessment of the entrepreneurial capacity of micro firms’ owners and to determine their 
business feasibility in order to prevent the financing of firms that are very likely to fail. 
Then, potential successful entrepreneurs should be provided with technical assistance 
and taught appropriate management skills in order to be able to make the right 
investment and business decisions by themselves. Only after this process should 
microcredit become available to support further growth of their firms. For those lacking 
entrepreneurship spirit and skills and/or operating in sectors of activity where markets 
are either saturated or lacking, microcredit is unlikely to be the solution. Instead, 
priority should be given to their professional training and specialization in higher-value 
activities. In these cases, the microfinance institutions should take a proactive role in 
 19
identifying and promoting higher-value occupations suitable for them and provide 
personal services such as individual business advice and assistance in developing 
linkages with markets and suppliers. 
Third, our investigation confirms that micro firms owned by females need to resort 
more often to outside start-up capital due to insufficient savings. As their illiteracy rate 
is clearly higher than men’s (32.0% vs. 14.6% in 2002, see UNDP, 2004), greater 
resources should be directed toward female education activities as they facilitate the 
uptake of microcredit opportunities. Additionally, some employment and professional 
training policy mechanisms should be directed specifically towards women, since in 
Cape Verde half of the female employment is concentrated in food retailing and 
catering (see Bourdet, 2000). 
Fourth, our econometric model estimates that the probability of resorting to external 
financing is higher in the case of young and old microentrepreneurs. Relative to the 
former, provided they possess appropriate education and skills, the first concern of 
microfinance institutions should be the provision of intensive entrepreneurial training 
programs and access to microcredit. Otherwise, instead of credit, the financial support 
of measures aiming at improving their level of education and at creating a 
professionalizing alternative for the youths who abandon the school system in order to 
facilitate their entry in the job market (the unemployment rate in Cape Verde is clearly 
higher among youths than among adults) should be the priority of microfinance 
policymakers. In contrast, providing credit, technical assistance and some basic 
management skills should be the focus of microfinance programs directed specifically 
to older microentrepreneurs. 
Finally, if microcredit policies for Cape Verde are designed in function of the 
microentrepreneurs’ characteristics analyzed in the preceding paragraphs, no specific 
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policy for rural areas seems to be necessary. Indeed, our econometric analysis indicates 
that after taking into account those characteristics, the location of the firm does not 
affect significantly the need for outside start-up capital. However, since the majority of 
the neediest microentrepreneurs live in rural zones, a good coverage of these areas has 
to be guaranteed. 
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Table 1. Socio-economic indicators for Cape Verde (2002) 
 Cape Verde Sub-Saharan Africa 
Developing 
countries 
GDP per capita (PPP US$) 5000 1790 4054 
GDP per capita annual growth 
rate (%, 1990-2002) 3.4 --- 2.8 
Annual population growth rate (%, 
1975-2002) 1.8 2.7 1.9 
Urban population (%) 55.1 35.0 41.4 
HDI index 0.717 0.465 0.663 
Life expectancy (years) 70.0 46.3 64.6 
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live 
births) 29 108 61 
Adult literacy rate (%) 75.7 63.2 76.7 
Combined primary, secondary 
and tertiary gross enrolment 
ratio (%) 
73 44 60 
Source: UNDP (2004) 
 23
Table 2. Sample characteristics of surveyed urban and rural respondents in 
Cape Verde and urban respondents in Mexico 
Cape Verde Mexicoc Variable Total Urban Rural p-valuea Urban p-valueb
Microenterprises 
(mean values) 
Age 8.7 9.5 7.3 0.1417 10.6 0.3048
Number of employees 2.3 2.6 1.8 0.0000 1.8 0.0000
(%) 
Trade sector 50.0 39.0 69.8 0.0006 34.7 0.4490
 
Microentrepreneurs 
(mean values) 
Age (2003) 41.9 45.0 36.3 0.0001 43.5 0.2613
Age (start) 33.2 35.5 29.0 0.0002 --- ---
Years of schooling 6.1 6.9 4.8 0.0020 7.5 0.1628
Years of experience (2003) 11.7 12.9 9.6 0.0356 --- ---
(%) 
Women 53.3 44.2 69.8 0.0048 22.4 0.0001
Married 70.0 79.2 53.5 0.0042 70.8 0.0727
Owned other businesses 35.8 36.4 34.9 0.8721 11.0 0.0000
Involuntary entry into self-employment 42.5 31.2 62.8 0.0006 14.1 0.0014
a Relative to the significance of the difference between sample means or proportions of urban and rural 
respondents. 
b Relative to the significance of the difference between sample means or proportions of urban Cape Verde and 
Mexican micro firms. 
c See Heino and Págan (2001). 
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Table 3. Distribution of initial financing sources of respondents by location 
 Total Urban Rural 
External sources 51.7% 41.6% 69.8% 
Internal sources 48.3% 58.4% 30.2% 
Alternative external sources:  
- Family 48.4% 37.5% 60.0% 
- Banks 21.0% 31.3% 10.0% 
- Microcredit 14.5% 6.3% 23.3% 
- Other informal lenders* 16.1% 25.0% 6.7% 
* Includes local moneylenders, customers, suppliers and friends. 
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Table 4. Probit model 
Independent variable Coefficient St. error p-value Partial 
effects 
AGE -0.216 0.086 0.012 
AGE2 0.003 0.001 0.013 -0.009 
FEMALE 0.586 0.323 0.070 0.230 
MARRIED 0.286 0.303 0.346 0.114 
EDUCATION 0.064 0.037 0.089 0.025 
OTHER_FIRMS -0.189 0.298 0.526 -0.075 
INVOLUNTARY 0.825 0.298 0.006 0.318 
URBAN -0.412 0.325 0.204 -0.162 
TRADE -0.050 0.321 0.875 -0.020 
PRE_1991 -0.916 0.318 0.004 -0.350 
CONSTANT 3.138 1.452 0.031  
     
Number of observations 120   
Log-likelihood value -65.071   
LR test 36.08 0.000  
Pseudo R2 0.217   
RESET test 0.458 0.795  
Heteroskedasticity test 4.094 0.943  
Percent correctly 
predicted 
    
 - total funding 72.5   
 - external funding 75.8   
 - internal funding 69.0   
Notes: For the RESET and heteroskedasticity tests applied, see Pagan and Vella (1989) and Davidson 
and MacKinnon (1984), respectively. The pseudo R2 is that suggested by McFadden (1974). The partial 
effects are measured at the averages of each variable and, in the case of the dummy variables, 
correspond to their change from 0 to 1. 
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Table 5. Probabilities (in percentage) of resorting to outside start-up capital for different profiles of variables 
AGE 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
EDUCATION 0 17 0 17 0 17 0 17 0 17 0 17 0 17 0 17 
FEMALE 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
INVOLUNTARY 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
PRE_1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MARRIED 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
OTHER_FIRMS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
URBAN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TRADE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Prob(y = 1) 24.1 64.8 45.4 83.3 54.9 88.6 76.1 96.3 6.0 31.9 16.7 54.6 23.3 63.8 44.3 82.7 
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Figure 1. Structure of employment and GDP by sector of activity 
24%
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17%
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Sources: IMF (2005) and ADB (2005). 
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Figure 2. Sample characteristics of surveyed microenterprises 
A: Age
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28.3%
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B: Number of employees
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C: Sector of activity
50.0% 50.0%
 Trade  Services / small
industry
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 Urban  Rural
 
 29
Figure 3. Sample characteristics of surveyed microentrepreneurs 
A: Age (2003)
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B: Age
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C: Gender
46.7%
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D: Civil status
70.0%
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 Married  Not married
 
E: Years of schooling
6.7%
65.0%
14.2%
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F: Years of experience 
(2003)
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30.0% 27.5%
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G: Previous businesses
35.8%
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H: Entry into self-
employment
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Note: data relative to the year the micro firm was created unless otherwise stated. 
 30
Figure 4. Initial financing sources of surveyed microentrepreneurs 
A: Preferences
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Figure 5. Relationship between the microentrepreneurs’ age and the resort to 
outside start-up capital 
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